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A BLUEPRINT FOR CENSORSHIP OF OBSCENE MATERIAL:
STANDARDS FOR PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
I.
INTRODUCTION
Censorship, or prior restraint upon speech and press, has long
plagued our judicial system and continues to do so. The First Amend-
ment of the Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ... ." In 1644, John
Milton assailed an Act of Parliament which provided for censorship of
the press. He contended that every man has the right to make public
his honest views, without previous censure, and stated that it would be
impossible to find any man base enough to accept the office of censor
and at the same time good enough to perform his duties.' Blackstone,
in declaring the Common Law of his day, stated that the liberty of the
press consisted in laying no previous restraints upon publication. However,
if one published "improper, mischievous or illegal" material, he was subject
to criminal sanctions.2 Faced with these problems of the English Common
Law, our forefathers sought to preserve inviolate the freedom of speech
and press to all.
II.
ABSORPTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTO THE FOURTEENTH
The First Amendment was readily acknowledged as protecting free-
dom of speech and press from abridgment by the Federal Government,
but considerable doubt surrounded the individual states' obligation to
afford the same protection to the First Amendment freedoms.3 However,
1. MILTON, APPEAL FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING (1644).
2. 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 145 (1876).
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: but
this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom
from censure from criminal matter when published. Every free man has an un-
doubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this
is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mis-
chievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject
the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before
and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices
of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted
points in learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at
present any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a
fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency is necessary for the
preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid
foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse
only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint
hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is
still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments, destructive to
the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.
3. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922). Mr. Justice Pitney,
speaking for the Court, stated: "[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the states any restric-
tions about 'freedom of speech' or the 'liberty of silence'..
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in 1925, the Supreme Court stated that: "For present purposes we may
and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press - which are
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress - are
among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by
the States."'4 Two years later, this dictum became the accepted doctrine 5
which was to be applied extensively." The Court has subsequently held
that municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute state
action and must strictly conform to constitutional standards. 7 In Cant-
well v. Connecticut, the Court decided, without dissent, that even though
a judicial remedy was available for abuses in a system of licensing, such
a system amounted to a prior restraint upon the freedoms of speech and
press. The Court held that a statute authorizing previous restraint upon
the exercise of the guaranteed freedom by judicial decision after trial
is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one providing for like restraint
by administrative action.8 Although generally regarded as the keystone
of liberty, the freedoms of speech and of the press are not absolute; they
are subject to abuse by individuals who use them to disseminate those
materials which possess no redeeming social value, and for such abuse
sanctions must be imposed.
III.
LIBERTY OF SPEECH AND PRESS NOT UNCONDITIONAL
An individual's freedom from previous restraints has never been
regarded as absolute. The Court in Near v. Minnesota, stated that, although
freedom of speech and press are fundamental liberties, "the protection
even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited." In Roth v.
United States, the Court observed that in the light of ". . . history, it
is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was
not intended to protect every utterance."' 0 Though this protection is
not unlimited, it proscribes, at least, governmental adoption of those
procedures which tend to impinge upon constitutionally protected expres.
sion." It has been suggested that "what is needed is a pragmatic assess-
ment of its operation in particular circumstances. The generalization
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
5. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
6. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) ; Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58 (1963) Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 887 (1960); Speiser v. Randall,
357 U.S. 513 (1958) ; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ; Grosegean v. Amer. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
243, 249 (1936).
7. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444 (1938).
8. 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940) ; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
10. 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957).
11. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
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that prior restraint is particularly obnoxious in civil liberties cases
must yield to more particular analysis.'
21
From what might be characterized as an atmosphere of aversion to
prior restraints, and over the vigorous dissenting opinions of Justices,
Black and Douglas,13 the Supreme Court has given its sanction to two
cases 14 in particular, which, in effect, provide for "constitutional censor-
ship." Although there is admonition in Roth that "the door . . . into
this area [the First Amendment] cannot be left ajar; it must be kept
tightly closed and opened only the slightest crack necessary to prevent en-
croachment upon more important interests,"' 5 the censor's foot now appears
to have opened the door permanently. In Bantam Books v. Sullivan,
Mr. Justice Clark observed that Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago
is not inconsistent with the Court's traditional attitude of disfavor toward
prior restraints of expression,' 6 since the Court therein decided only that
prior restraints were not unconstitutional per se and that the Times Film
holding was expressly confined to motion pictures.
IV.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - THE KEY TO CENSORSHIP
"The essence of justice is largely procedural,"' 17 for "civil liberties
like substantive law itself, frequently inhere in the interstices of proce-
dure and are none the worse for it."18 This is essentially the basis for the
opinion of Chief Justice Warren in Jacobellis v. Ohio. He observed that
law enforcement agencies often do only that which is easy in the enforce-
ment of legislation in the area of free speech.
As a result, courts are often presented with procedurally bad cases
and, in dealing with them, appear to be acquiescing in the dissemina-
tion of obscenity. But if cases were well prepared and were con-
ducted with the appropriate concern for constitutional safeguards,
courts would not hesitate to enforce the laws against obscenity.
Thus, enforcement agencies must realize that there is no royal road
to enforcement; hard and conscientious work is required. 19
Freedoms of expression are vulnerable to gravely damaging, yet barely
visible, abuses20 and consequently regulations of obscenity must scrupu-
lously embody the most rigorous safeguards. Such a constitutionally re-
12. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rnv. 533, 539
(1951).
13. Freedman v. Maryland, supra note 6, at 61 (1965).
14. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Kingsley Brooks, Inc. v.
Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
15. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
16. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
17. 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA'rlsz 506 (1st ed. 1958).
18. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. Rev. 533, 554
(1951).
19. 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964). (Dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren,
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quired procedure must focus searchingly on the question of obscenity, 21
but a state is not, by any means, to be considered free to adopt whatever
procedures it desires in dealing with obscenity. It must be ever con-
scious of the possible consequences for constitutionally protected speech.
22
The Supreme Court has, in effect, arrived at the conclusion that "[F]ree-
dor of expression can be suppressed if, and to the extent it is so closely
brigaded with legal action as to be an inseparable part of it."'23 The
essence of the problem ". . . is the formulation of constitutionally allow-
able safeguards which society may take against evil without impinging
upon the necessary dependence of a free society on the fullest scope of
free expression. '2 4 The line to be drawn between unconditionally guaran-
teed speech and speech which may be regulated is fine, 25 dim and uncertain 2
and calls for "sensitive tools."
'27
A great many courts and scholars have sought to devise a test for
designating material protected or unprotected, obscene or not obscene.
Obscenity is not to be afforded the constitutional protection rendered
to speech and press. 28 The test developed by the Supreme Court in Roth
for the identification of obscene material is ". . . whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest," that is,
"having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts. ' 29 In Roth, the Court
applied the above test to materials being considered under the Federal
Postal Law30 as well as under a California obscenity statute,31 acknowl-
edging that both Federal and State laws regulating obscenity must be
equipped with the same safeguards. The Roth decision dealt solely with
a test for literature being examined under a criminal statute which pro-
vided for a jury trial. The question whether this test is adequate for
application in a civil proceeding which does not provide for a jury trial
remains to be answered.
Certain ramifications of the Roth test have been clarified. In Manual
Enterprises v. Day,3 2 the Supreme Court considered the situation in
which the allegedly obscene literature was limited to a particular class,
homosexuals. The Court stated that, in applying the rule of Roth v.
United States,3 3 the requirement of "patent offensiveness" refers to the
offensiveness of the material to the standard of the national community.
While this material was patently offensive to the national standard of
21. Marcus v. Property Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
22. Id. at 731 ; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
23. Roth v. United States, supra note 15, at 514 (1957).
24. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 694 (1959).
25. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
26. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 66 (1963).
27. Speiser v. Randall, supra note 25, at 525 (1958).
28. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 66 (1963).
29. Roth v. United States, supra note 15, at 486 (1957).
30. 62 STAT. 768, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1948).
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 311. This section has been amended to make knowledge a
necessary part of the offense, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 311 (a)-(e).
32. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
33. 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
[VOL. 11
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1965], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss1/7
FALL 1965]
decency, 34 it did not appeal to the prurient interest of the average person
and was therefore not obscene.
Another interpretation would limit the Roth test to the identification
of materials known as "hard-core" pornography. 35 Mr. Justice Stewart
believes that by negative implication in the Supreme Court's decisions
since Roth and Alberts, that ". . . under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments criminal laws in this area are constitutionally limited to
hard-core pornography. ' 3 It is regrettable that Mr. Justice Harlan
failed to persuade the Court to shift to the new and apparently narrower
concept of hard-core pornography. 37 One court has defined "hard-core
pornography" as material which ". . . focuses predominantly upon what
is sexually morbid, grossly perverse and bizarre, without any artistic
or scientific purpose or justification."38 It has also been described as
"dirt for dirt's sake" 39 or "dirt for money's sake," 40 but these definitions
provide little in the way of standards by which to judge material, and
both scholars and the Courts are destined to encounter the same difficulties
in their quest for a clear definition of this term that they did with
"obscenity. ' '41
V.
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
The Supreme Court has held that a state may not superimpose a
civil sanction, aimed at the regulation of obscenity, upon a similar crimi-
nal sanction. Such duplication would render the latter unnecessary, and
thus eliminate the safeguards of the criminal process. Such a "form of
regulation creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than
those that attended reliance upon criminal law."'42 In Bantam Books,
34. Manual Enterprises v. Day, supra note 11, at 488 (1962). Although the Court
held this to be the standard used in the application of a federal statute, it is submitted
that the national standard of decency should be applied to state statutes as well since
fundamental freedoms are involved. See Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Ob-
scenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 112-14 (1960).
35. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 489 (1962); People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
36. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) ; A Quantity of Copies of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
37. Roth v. United States, supra note 15, at 508 (1957). However, it is to be
noted that Mr. Justice Harlan would permit the states to provide for a greater degree
of restraint upon such materials than he would the Federal Government. He would
limit the Federal Government to the control of "hard-core" pornography while per-
mitting the states to use a broader standard. See also, Kalven, The Metaphysics of
the Law of Obscenity, THE SuP. CT. Rtv. 39 (1960).
38. People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 586, 175 N.E.2d 681,
686, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 376 (1961). The court held that prohibitions of N~w YORK
PENAL LAW § 1141 apply- only to "hard-core pornography."
39. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 54 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.
N.Y. 1933).
40. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, supra note 24, at 692 (1959).
41. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964). (Dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, Mr. Justice Clark concurring.)
42. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 70 (1963).
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Inc. v. Sullivan, the Court considered a system of prior administrative
restraints by a State Commission, a non-judicial body, designed for the
dual purpose of (1) educating the public concerning obscene publications
which tend to corrupt youths, and (2) recommending prosecution. It
was empowered to notify distributors of publications which it found to be
objectionable and to warn them that failure to cooperate would result
in a recommendation of prosecution. This statute was condemned as
an invalid prior restraint and intimidation leading to suppression.
The Court's reasons provide, by way of negative implication, certain
procedural safeguards essential for protection of the fundamental free-
doms. There must be a provision for notice and hearing before the
Commission is permitted to list the publications as objectionable. Oppor-
tunity for prompt judicial review of the Commission's findings must also
be available. Mr. Justice Clark criticized the Court for dropping "a demo-
lition bomb on the Commission's practice without clearly indicating what
might be salvaged from the wreckage." Mr. Justice Clark believes that
such a statute would be constitutional if it did not permit the Commission
to order prosecution of certain individuals. The Court held that any
system of prior restraints comes to it bearing a heavy presumption of
constitutional invalidity.48 To Justices Black and Clark, no indulgence in
presumptions is necessary in regard to prior restraints. They would
forbid any such activity, for they believe that First Amendment rights
and the censors are incompatable. Authors, publishers, and vendors could
be subjected to sanctions for violating a valid criminal law which is
applied after publication and distribution, but would be protected by the
procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights, including trial by jury.44 The
doctrine appears to be a choice of the lesser of two evils; the danger of
violating the First Amendment freedoms overrides the danger from dis-
semination of unprotected literature prior to criminal prosecution.
VI.
DEVISING A CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
A. Formulating Constitutional Statutes
1. Scienter
A statute seeking to restrain obscenity must provide for, or be judici-
ally construed45 to require, proof of scienter as an essential element in
any prosecution for its violation. However, knowledge by a bookseller
of the obscene or indecent character of the material possessed by him may
43. Id. at 70; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
44. Id. at 70; See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 160 (1959). Concurring
opinion by Mr. Justice Black: "Censorship is the deadly enemy of freedom and progress.
The plain language of the Constitution forbids it. I protest against the Judiciary giving
it a foothold here."
45. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), rehearing denied, 361 U.S. 950 (1960).
[VOL. 11
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often be proved by circumstantial evidence ;46 actual knowledge of the con-
tents of the material is not a sine qua non to establish scienter. 47 Mr. Justice
Brennan speaking for the Court in Smith v. California, indicated that
some cimcumstances require a bookseller or distributor to investigate
material in his control or explain his failure to do so.
48
The Model Penal Code 49 requires that one must knowingly or reck-
lessly sell, deliver, or provide, or offer or agree to sell, deliver, or
provide such material. This qualification takes the form of a rebuttable
presumption; that is, one who disseminates or possesses obscene material
in the course of his business is presumed to do so knowingly and recklessly,
and he bears the burden of proving otherwise. It is clear that eyewitness
testimony of a bookseller's perusal is not essential in proving his aware-
ness of its contents. It is submitted that the Model Penal Code provides
the most constitutionally acceptable approach to this problem, but the
specifity of construction of such a statute presents problems which must
be considered in the light of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
2. Specificity in Construction
A statute which aims to restrain publication, distribution, or presenta-
tion of obscene materials must meet certain basic standards of construc-
tion and specificity. The prohibited acts must be so defined as to exclude
legitimate exercises of the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
The statute must be reasonably restricted to the evil with which it deals;
therefore, one which prohibits distribution to the general reading public
of books containing obscene language tending to corrupt the morals of
youth fails, since it arbitrarily curtails the constitutional liberties of adults.
This statute concerned general distribution and its nullification does not
preclude a state from labeling such material "for adults only."50
The terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently
explicit to inform those subject to them what conduct on their part will
render them liable. They cannot be so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must guess at their meaning and differ as to their application.
Such inadequacies violate the most essential conceptions of due process
of law.5 ' The meaning of the words must be sufficiently well known to
46. State v. Andrews, 150 Conn. 92, 186 A.2d 546 (1962) ; Cohen v. State, 125
So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960); Demetropolos v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 175
N.E.2d 259 (1961) ; State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 110 N.W.2d 514 (1961) ; People v.
Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174 N.E.2d 470, 214 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1961) ; State v. Jackson,
224 Ore. 337, 356 P.2d 495 (1960).
47. State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 147 A.2d 686 (1958).
48. Smith v. California, supra note 45, at 154.
49. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
50. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). This has been referred to as the
shift of audience test which declares that the average adult is the constitutionally
required audience. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, THE SuP. CT.
REv. 7 (1960).
51. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1924) ; Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 200, 221 (1913).
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afford a cognizable standard of illegality.5 2 "A failure of a statute limit-
ing freedom of expression to give fair notice to what acts will be punished
and such a statute's inclusion of prohibitions against expression, protected
by the principles of the First Amendment, violates an accused's rights
under procedural due process and freedom of the press.15 3  Thus, a
statute14 which forbids the selling, giving away, or distribution of ma-
terial devoted to the publication of, and principally made up of, "criminal
news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories
of deeds of bloodshed, lust, or crime" was declared unconstitutional for
failure to give adequate notice to those affected. 5
B. Constitutional Administration
1. Burden of Persuasion
Generally, the states are empowered to regulate procedures under
which their laws are carried out, which include placing the burden of
persuasion; but, in so doing, they may not offend "some principle of
justice so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. " 56 A state may not provide that the finding of
an indictment, or the proof of the identity of an accused will create a
presumption that all of the facts essential to guilt exist.57 The burden
of producing evidence may shift, but only after the State has "proved
enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what
has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a
balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shift-
ing of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without sub-
jecting the accused to hardship or oppression."5
The Supreme Court has also struck down state statutes which un-
fairly shift the burden in civil cases. 59 Although due process may not
always compel the full formalities of a criminal prosecution before criminal
advocacy can be suppressed, the state's procedures must be adequate to
safeguard against invasion of free speech and press.60 The state must
carry the burden of producing evidence in the first instance, and of per-
suading the fact finder at the conclusion of the trial. 61
52. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925); United States
v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92 (1921).
53. Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915).
54. NEw YORK PENAL LAW § 1141.
55. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1948) ; see also Fox v. Wash-
ington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
56. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
57. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
58. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88, 89 (1934).
59. Western & A. R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
C0. 11i:L'ley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
61. r pci.- -. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
[VOL. 11
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2. Trial by Jury
Trial by jury is guaranteed in all criminal cases,6 2 but "the Due
Process Clause does not subject the States to the necessity of having
trial by jury in misdemeanor prosecutions. '63 Since, in Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, the defendants did not request a jury, the Supreme Court
has not been compelled to deal with this question.6 4 In Kingsley, the
New York statute 5 provided for a jury trial at the discretion of the
court; their verdict would be only advisory, to be followed or rejected
by the trial judge as he deemed proper. Mr. Justice Brennan, in his
dissent in Kingsley, states that obscenity statutes should afford the defen-
dant a jury determination on the issue of obscenity and that a statute
that does not so provide fails to properly effect the standard necessary
to safeguard rights arising from the Constitution. 6 In this case, the
judge still must decide whether reasonable men might differ on the issue of
obscenity before delegating the question to the jury.67 Since the average
man is represented by the jury and not by a judge, logic dictates imple-
mentation of the jury's expertise for the issue of obscenity.68 The jury,
which represents a cross-section of the community, has a special aptitude
for reflecting the view of the average person. Thus, the jury's considera-
tion of the question of obscenity provides a particularly competent applica-
tion of the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Roth.69
This approach has been adopted by the Model Penal Code. In
preserving the independent judgment of the court, the Code requires the
court to determine whether an issue exists as to obscenity and to "...
dismiss a prosecution for obscenity if it is satisfied that the material is
not obscene."' 70 If the court finds an obscenity question present, the defen-
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, sec. 2.
63. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 444 (1957).
64. Id. at 443, 444.
65. Compare NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 430 with NEw YORK CITY
CRIMINAL COURT ACT § 31, sub. 1 (c) and sub. 4.
66. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra note 60, at 448 (1957). (Dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan.)
67. Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; United States
v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1930).
68. Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, THE SUP. CT. REV.
39 (1960).
69. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, supra note 60, at 448 (1957) ; See also Chafee,
Censorship of Plays and Books, 1 BILL Ov RIGHTS REV. 16, 23 (1940) :
Accordingly my conclusion, both as to plays and books, is that decisions on
the issue of indecency should be made by the citizens themselves through qualified
juries. The practical problem is to make such jury verdicts more convenient than
the ordinary criminal prosecution, so as to lessen the risks of honest theatre
owners, producers, publishers, and booksellers who are anxious to obtain legal
determinations before going ahead.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See comment to
this section :
What we preserve in the present draft is the independent judgment of the court
on the question of obscenity without impairing defendant's right to a jury trial.
The action of the Supreme Court of the United States in a series of obscenity cases
after the Roth decision indicates the large extent to which the question of obscenity
is one of law in any case, because of the application of the First Amendment.
COMMENTS
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dant's right to a jury trial is maintained since he may demand such a
procedure. It is submitted that the fundamental freedoms of speech
and press should be afforded no less than this degree of protection.
3. Independent Judicial Review
The aim of law makers in drafting censorship statutes is to provide
federal, state and municipal authorities with a quick and effective system
of restraint. Although the threat of criminal sanctions possesses some de-
terrent value, a system which provides for restraint prior to the dis-
semination of objectionable materials is clearly more effective. However,
before such a restraint is issued, constitutional safeguards necessitate evalu-
ation of the obscenity charge by some competent authority. The most
qualified candidate for this inglorious but necessary task is the judiciary.
A judge is learned in the law,. skilled in its application, and a member
of the community which is to accept or reject the material in question.
However, though he may be the best qualified, his individual prejudices
and incompetencies might so affect his decision that adequate protection
would not be accorded our fundamental freedoms. Thus, perhaps a three
judge court is the most appropriate vehicle to determine the issue within
constitutional bounds.
Further problems befall the legislator who would properly devise
the function of that administrative body known as a censorship board.
Such a board should not be permitted to pass any final judgment on the
issue of obscenity since this would subvert the function of the court.
However, the Board could, to some extent, screen questionable materials
prior to their presentation to the court. The problem is drafting the
appropriate limitations for the board's activities, so that any action they
do take will not be a restraint prior to judicial determination. Finally,
questions remain as to the manner of issuing these initial restraints,
provisions for immediacy of court decision concerning them, and right
to appeal from such decisions. Surveying the recent cases may present
guidelines for a feasible aproach to these problems.
VII.
WHAT WILL THE COURT ALLOW?
A. Books and Literature
"Prior restraint" has been defined as administrative controls prior
to any publication, such as licensing or other duress forbidding publica-
tion prior to approval by public officials. 71 Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court has provided little in the way of specific requirements for a constitu-
tional system of prior restraint.
71. William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana, 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
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In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,72 a five to four decision savoring
of prior restraint,73 the Court approved, as a valid limitation, a system
which provided for an equity proceeding which was deemed equivalent to
a prosecution. Under the New York procedure, 74 law enforcement officers
could obtain a limited injunction (1) ordering a bookseller to refrain
from distribution of material judicially declared obscene, and (2) pro-
viding for seizure and destruction of all copies thereof. Closely defined
procedural safeguards accompanied the remedy and provided for (1)
an ex parte hearing by a judge on the issue of obscenity of specific
materials presented to him, prior to issuance of a limited injunction; (2)
notice to the seller that sale of the questionable material before the trial
may subject him to penal consequences; this arises from the limited
injunction;75 (3) provision on the day of complaint for defendants to
show cause within four days why the injunction pendente lite should not
be issued; (4) right to trial of the issue within one day after joinder
of issues; (5) decision in two days after the conclusion of the trial.
A further provision required a court to exercise an independent check
prior to the imposition of any restraint, and the restraints could affect
only named publications.
The Court's approval rested upon the provision for adequate notice,
judicial hearing, and fair determination of the issue of obscenity. How-
ever, in effect, the threat of penal sanction prior to an adversary proceeding
exists. "Any system of censorship, injunction, or seizure may, of course,
to some extent serve to trammel by delaying distribution or otherwise,
freedom of expression; yet so may the threat of criminal prosecution
as the Court noted in Kingsley Books."76 Thus, one must conclude
that a statute providing for an ex parte hearing prior to any injunction
or notice of intent to prosecute fulfills the constitutional requirement that
judicial determination of the issue be made prior to any restraint of
speech or press. Although not decided in Kingsley, it is submitted that
an administrative censorship commission, made up of qualified and duly
appointed officials could also submit questionable materials to an appro-
priate court for an ex parte hearing, with the limitation that such sub-
mission be prior to any threats or coercive tactics on the part of the
commission. The Kingsley scheme appears to provide for constitutional
censorship, but it is questionable whether an ex parte hearing affords due
process to a fundamental liberty.
72. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
73. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 62 (1965). Mr. Justice Douglas, with
whom Mr. Justice Black concurred, stated:
I would not admit the censor even for the limited role accorded him in
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown .... Any authority to obtain a temporary injunc-
tion gives the State 'the paralyzing power of a censor.' The regime of Kingsley
Books substitutes punishment by contempt for punishment by jury trial. I would
put an end to all forms and types of censorship and give full literal meaning to the
command of the First Amendment. (Citations omitted.)
74. NEw YORK CODE Or CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22(a).
75. The value of this safeguard is questionable in that it serves as a deterrent
against distribution prior to an adversary proceeding.
76. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 224 (1964).
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B. Times Film Corp. to Freedman - Censorship of Motion Pictures
That motion pictures are within the free speech and free press
guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments is clear.7 7 Justices
Black and Douglas stated in a per curiam opinion that "... the First
Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods of com-
municating ideas."'78 These two Justices also consider motion picture
censorship in advance of publication as wholly void, and insist that only
inflexible application of this doctrine will save the Supreme Court from
deciding such issues on an ad hoc basis. However, the majority of the
Court in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, has held that censorship
of motion pictures is not unconstitutional per se.7 9 Although entitled to
the same basic safeguards as other types of communication, motion pictures
present unique problems which call for variations of the approved pro-
cedure of Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.
In the case of motion pictures, preview by the distributor or exhibitor
can be expected prior to any public presentation. He can be expected
to know its content. Further, a motion picture's impact upon its audience
is immediate and a great number of viewers may be exposed to it in a
short period of time.
In the Times case, injunctive relief was denied a motion picture
distributor who contended that censorship in advance of exhibition was
void on its face as equivalent to a prior restraint against publication.
The distributor sought to compel a municipal censor to license a film with-
out its submission for approval. The Court maintained that, although
motion pictures are included within the speech and press guarantees of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, there is no absolute freedom to
exhibit once publicly, since it has never been held that all prior restraints
on speech are invalid. This, in effect, is all that the Times case held, and
it must not be read too broadly in examining the problem of legitimate
standards upon which a municipality may reject a film for public dis-
tribution.
In Zenith Int'l Film Corp. v. City of Chicago,80 the Chicago movie
censorship statute was once again put to the test and, this time, failed as
a violation of procedural due process of law. These procedural inadequacies
were (1) the exhibitor was not accorded a full and fair hearing, includ-
ing an opportunity to defend the nature of the material; (2) he was
granted no opportunity to present evidence of contemporary community
77. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 502 (1952) ; United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). But see, Lockhart and McClure,
Ccnsorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. R:v.
108 (1960).
It has been suggested that the requirement of scienter could be given a more
limited application in respect to motion picture exhibitors, since exhibitors can
reasonably be required to know the content of a motion picture before exhibiting it.
78. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954).
79. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
80. 291 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1961).
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standards; (3) no standards were stipulated for the selection of members
of the Film Review Board; (4) responsible city officials failed to view
the film as a whole; (5) there were no safeguards to preclude an entirely
arbitrary judgment on the Board's part; (6) the appeal to the mayor
did not provide for a hearing de novo; (7) no statement issued to explain
refusal of the permit. The Court concluded that the "... Times Filn
case does not provide carte blanche authorization for ad hoc, unfair, abor-
tive municipal licensing procedures," but it does recognize the city's
power to impose prior restraints on movies. However, the system must
guarantee that no unreasonable strictures on individual liberty will result
from its application.8 '
Pennsylvania fared no better than Chicago in its attempt to provide
the "proper system." In William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Dana8 2
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the Motion Picture Control
Act 83 unconstitutional. The statute was quite comprehensive and required
(1) that the film be registered forty eight hours prior to the first showing,
(2) that the exhibitor furnish an exact copy of the film upon request of
the Commission, (3) that a majority vote of the Board of Censors could
disapprove it or label it unsuitable for those under seventeen years of
age. Right of appeal to the Board and to a reexamination in the presence
of two Board members was assured in addition to right of appeal to the
Court of Common Pleas of the proper county. Criminal sanctions author-
ized for violation of the act were a fine of $400 to $1000 or a prison sen-
tence not exceeding six months.
In declaring the act unconstitutional, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court considered a number of procedural pitfalls in the drafting of censor-
ship statutes. The requirement that the film be registered forty eight hours
prior to exhibition was declared a prior restraint and consequently re-
pugnant to the Constitution. A fee for such registration was considered
an unconstitutional licensing of free speech. Concerning the lack of
provision for a jury trial, the court stated that constitutionally protected
rights are not to be so adroitly subverted and that the issue of obscenity
is to be decided by ". . . an impartial jury of the vicinage . . ." and not
"by the artful device of granting administrative officials the power to
disapprove the utterance if they think it is obscene .... ",84 The Com-
mission was composed of three persons selected by the governor with-
out statutory standards for education or competency. Such deficiency
rendered its composition unconstitutional. The Commission, in effect,
supplanted the jury's function, but no provision was made for challenge,
peremptorily or for cause.
With respect to independent judicial determination, the statute pro-
vided for an appeal to the court of common pleas from the Commission's
81. Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, supra note 79, at 50.
82. 405 Pa. 83, 173 A.2d 59 (1961).
83. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 70.1-14 (1959).
84. 405 Pa. 83, 95, 173 A.2d 59, 65 (1961).
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decision, but did not provide for a trial on the issue of obscenity. Pro-
cedural due process was further violated by the provision for criminal
sanctions, without proof of obscenity, but upon the mere showing of an
unregistered or unapproved film. These findings were, in effect, rec-
ommendations and should be taken as such by state and municipal law-
makers, especially those in Pennsylvania.
In its most recent decision 5 in this area, the Supreme Court
held a Maryland Statute 6 unconstitutional because of the following pro-
visions: (1) upon the censor's disapproval of the film, the exhibitor
was to assume the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of per-
suading the courts that the film is protected expression; (2) once the
film was disapproved, exhibition was prohibited pending judicial review,
however protracted; and (3) no assurance of prompt judicial determina-
tion existed. The Court specified three procedural safeguards essential
to a movie censorship statute if it is not to be repugnant to the First
Amendment. First, the statute must place the burden of instituting judi-
cial proceedings upon the censor. Second, any restraint prior to judicial
review can be imposed only briefly in order to preserve the status quo.
Third, provision must be made for prompt judicial review. The Court
also held that a State may require submission of a film prior to its show-
ing, but this ". . . requirement cannot be administered in a manner which
would lend an effect of finality to the censor's determination. .... ,,sT
VIII.
CONCLUSION
Prior restraint by an administrative or law enforcement agency is
not permitted. Censorship boards or commissions may be set up, if
standards of education and competency of its members are designed to
guard against arbitrary decisions. Decisions by such commissions may
not be used to threaten a publisher, distributor, or vendor. It is submitted
that decisions by such commissions should be used only to aid law enforce-
ment agents in obtaining possibly objectionable material. Such materials
should then be presented to a judge and subjected to at least an ex parte
hearing as required by Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown. If the judge
in an ex parte hearing finds the material obscene, the defendant should
be entitled to an immediate full hearing before any limited injunction
is issued. If, after the hearing, the judge believes the material to be
obscene, there should be a provision for a trial by jury within a few weeks.
Whether the action is civil or criminal, it must provide adequate safeguards
for our fundamental freedoms.
John A. Luchsinger
85. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
86. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 2 (1957).
87. Freedman v. Maryland, supra note 85, at 58.
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